G20 - Financial Institutions and Services: GeneralReturn

Significant changes in tax benefits starting in 2024 are driving shifts in the business strategies of companies distributing products under the tax regime of the long-term investment product. In the professional community, proposals are emerging for the potential regulation of entry fees for long-term investment products. This paper discusses the possible impact of regulating intermediary commissions on the overall sales volume of these state-supported products. The impact of pension product regulation on the functioning of the market for these products has been addressed in past publications by authors such as Šindelář and Erben (2017), as well as Musílek (2018). In this paper, I focus on the paradox of commission regulation for otherwise state-supported products and the self-regulating function of entry fees in determining commission levels. The introductory section compares retirement savings products from the perspective of the business strategies of distribution companies. This is followed by a comparison of the effects of two basic forms of entry fees. The final section explores additional implications of potential entry fee regulation.

This paper is a quantitative content analysis followed by qualitative analysis that aims to give evidence on carbon emissions disclosures of Czech banks and insurance companies in the period 2019–2021. It narrows literature review on Carbon accounting with focus on the Czech Republic. It further analyses carbon footprint reporting of the financial companies with focus on GHG emissions protocol and carbon financing. It tests hypothesis that large corporations and multinational firms have better ESG disclosure than small local Czech firms. It adds to the current knowledge how environmental reporting progressed in the past couple year. Additionally, it confirms previous findings that too many various standards for CO2 measurements are used and therefore, difficulty in comparability of reported data remains.

This paper discusses the issue of regulation and supervision of the distribution of financial products, launched by the article by Sindelar and Erben (2017). The introductory part of the article focuses on the essential conclusions from the above article. In addition, attention is paid to deepening the analysis of regulatory objectives, especially in the area of information asymmetry. The so-called complex concept of regulation is questioned in the following part of the paper. The final part of the paper analyzes the detailed context of pension reform in form II. pillar and its impact on III. pillar of the pension system in the Czech Republic.

The article deals with theoretical and practical dimension of the third generation of Basel regulatory standards. The implementation proves more complex than previously supposed. Modern bank regulation theory focus mainly on four areas: factors that lies beyond bank equity pricing, transmission channels of banking crisis on the international level, optimal design of the safety net, well-balanced intensity of regulatory restrictions. Unfortunately, in the real world, bank regulation standards do not often follow the recommendations of economic theory. The rules remain to be subject of policy influence of diverse advocacy groups including banks themselves. The aim of this article is to outline the main ways of actual economic research and the challenges that lie ahead. Special attention is paid to such issues as capital adequacy, moral hazard and tax distorsion of debt financing. The influence of increased capital adequacy requirements, actual income tax policy and deregulation on the stability of commercial banks is being questioned within the study.

Problem of current world economy results from reality that we do not know to manage comprehensive complicated economic word with elements unrestrained randomness. Way to implement mathematics to economic science in not efficient, the same statement is valid about "risk based approach". Effort to normative prediction put on the periphery of interest ethics problems. Crisis provoked political pressure on extensity of regulation. Dilemma is: to support of naturally correct economic surroundings or strong regulation to restrict unethical behavior.Overcoming our cognitive insufficiency and finding new paradigm with anticipation of unrestrained randomness is very acute.